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RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  EQUILIBRIUM:  GENERIC  EXISTENCE 
AND  THE  INFORMATION  REVEALED  BY  PRICES 
BY RoY RADNER 
When traders come to a market with different information about the items to be traded, 
the resulting market prices may reveal to some  traders information originally available 
only to others. The possibility for such inferences rests upon traders having "models" or 
"expectations" of how equilibrium prices are related to initial information. This relation- 
ship is endogenous,  which motivates the term "rational expectations  equilibrium." This 
paper shows that, in a particular model of asset trading, if the number of alternative states 
of initial information is finite then, generically, rational expectations equilibria exist that 
reveal to all traders all of their initial information. 
1.  INTRODUCTION1 
WHEN  TRADERS  COME to a market with different information about the items 
to be traded, the resulting market prices may reveal to some traders something 
about the  information  available to  other  traders. This phenomenon  might be 
important in the case of assets whose eventual values or utilities are not perfectly 
known  to  all traders at the  time  of  purchase,  as in the  trading of  land with 
uncertain quantities of mineral deposits, or in the trading of common stocks. A 
thorough theoretical analysis of this situation probably requires a more detailed 
specification  of  the  trading  mechanism  than  is  usual  in  general  equilibrium 
analysis. Nevertheless,  it is tempting to try to obtain results that are as indepen- 
dent as possible of the specifics of the trading mechanism, by using some suitable 
concept of equilibrium. 
The possibility for one trader to make inferences from market prices about the 
information  possessed  by  other  traders rests  upon  his  having  a  "model"  or 
"expectations" of how equilibrium prices are determined, i.e., how equilibrium 
prices are related to the information initially possessed by the various traders. But 
this relationship is endogenous  to the market system,  and if traders have any 
opportunity to compare the results of the operation of the market with their own 
models, then a suitable equilibrium concept would require that their models not 
be obviously controverted by their observations of the market. This motivates the 
term "rational expectations equilibrium." 
The particular  rational expectations equilibrium that one would obtain depends 
upon the traders' models  or expectations  of  the relationship between  traders' 
1 I am grateful to Jerry Green, Leonid Hurwicz, James Jordan, and David Kreps for very helpful 
discussions  of  the  problems  treated  in  this paper.  The  referees  made  important suggestions  for 
improving the exposition. 
The research and preparation of this paper were partly supported by National Science Foundation 
Grant SOC73-05652A01  to the University of California, Berkeley,  administered by the Center for 
Research  in Management  Science.  A  previous version of this paper was presented  at the NBER- 
CEME Seminar on Decentralization,  Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, April 29-May 
1, 1977. 
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initial information and equilibrium prices. In addition, there is the possibility that 
such an equilibrium might not even exist. In particular, one can give examples in 
which, if the trader must have perfect knowledge  of the relationship between 
initial information and equilibrium prices, then a rational expectations  equili- 
brium need  not  exist,  even  with  "standard" assumptions  about  preferences, 
endowments,  etc.2 However,  in this paper I shall show  that,  if the number of 
alternative states of initial information is finite, then the nonexistence of equilibrium 
with perfect market models is an  "accident," in that it requires special combina- 
tions of parameters of the system that are "negligible" in the whole parameter 
space, in a suitable sense. This situation may be summarized by the statement that 
"existence of rational expectations equilibrium is generic." 
The proof of generic existence  that I shall present demonstrates in addition a 
remarkable information efficiency property of equilibrium. Generically,  in the 
model considered here, a rational expectations equilibrium  reveals to all traders  the 
information possessed by all  of  the traders taken together.3 Seen  in a broader 
context,  this property of equilibrium might cast doubt on the incentives  for a 
trader to obtain information about the environment prior to entering the market, 
provided he could count on other traders obtaining the same information, which 
would then be revealed by market prices. But if each trader reasoned in this way, 
then no trader would obtain prior information, and so there would be no prior 
information for market prices to reveal! However, to examine this question more 
carefully one needs a model that reflects the dynamics of market adjustment and 
price formation.4 
Another approach would be to explore the case in which traders have models of 
market price determination that are imperfect or imprecise, but that are consis- 
tent with observations  of  the market during the process  of  model  revision or 
"learning." This approach will be followed  in a subsequent paper.5 
The concept of rational expectations equilibrium has also received considerable 
attention  in  the  macroeconomic  literature  (see  Shiller  [15]  for  a  review). 
However,  no  attempt  will  be  made  here  to  relate  the  present  paper  to  that 
literature. 
The proof of the main result of the present paper, on the generic existence and 
informational  efficiency  of  rational  expectations  equilibrium,  is  based  on  an 
auxiliary proposition that has some independent interest. Roughly speaking, this 
auxiliary proposition  concerns the comparison of ordinary exchange  equilibria 
under uncertainty in which traders have (subjective) probability beliefs about the 
2Nonexistence  of rational expectations equilibrium may be caused by a discontinuity in the market 
demand functions that can arise when traders use market prices to infer something about other traders' 
information.  This discontinuity was pointed  out  in Radner [13],  where  conditions  for the  Pareto 
optimality of rational expectations equilibrium were discussed. Specific examples of nonexistence of 
equilibrium have been given in Green [4] and Kreps [11]; a further discussion of existence  can be 
found in Jordan [7, 8]. 
3 Conditions under which equilibrium prices reveal traders' initial information have been explored 
in Green [3], Grossman [5], Grossman and Stiglitz [6], and Kihlstrom and Mirman [10]. 
4 See Beja [1] for a step in this direction. 
5 See Radner [14]. RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  EQUILIBRIUM  657 
payoff-relevant state of the environment. The proposition gives conditions under 
which,  generically,  two  exchange  economies  that  differ  only  in  the  traders' 
probability  distributions  will  have  different  equilibrium  prices.  Since  the 
argument leading to the main result (Section 3) is fairly long, I shall give a heuristic 
sketch in this introductory section. 
Pure Exchange under Uncertainty 
Consider first a pure exchange economy. The decision problem for trader i is to 
choose a vector of assets, which will be called his portfolio.  The eventual utility to i 
of his portfolio is uncertain at the time he purchases it. This is expressed by saying 
that  his  utility  depends  on  his  portfolio  and  on  the  environment  (which  is 
exogenous).  Each trader has a subjective probability distribution on the set of 
alternative environments, and we suppose that his criterion for choosing among 
alternative portfolios is expected  utility. Given his initial endowment  of assets, 
and given a vector of asset prices, he will demand a portfolio that maximizes his 
expected utility subject to the budget constraint that the cost of his portfolio not 
exceed the value of his initial endowment. For simplicity, I shall suppose that only 
nonnegative  portfolios  are allowed  (no short sales).  His  excess demand  is the 
vector of differences between the assets he demands and his initial endowments. 
Suppose that his utility function is sufficiently regular so that, for any vector of 
prices, his excess demand is unique. Let p denote the vector of assets prices, let X 
denote the array of subjective probability distributions of the environment (one 
for each trader), and let Z(p,  I)  denote  the corresponding total excess demand, 
i.e. the (vector) sum of the individual traders' excess demands. Given a probability 
array x, an equilibrium  is a price vector for which the total excess demand is zero, 
i.e. a solution p of the equation system 
(1.1)  Z(p,  T) = O. 
With sufficient regularity conditions on the traders' utility functions, at least one 
equilibrium will exist for every probability array. 
The auxiliary proposition deals with the question, under what conditions must 
two different probability arrays lead to different corresponding equilibria? Call a 
pair (X1, T2)  of probability arrays confounding if there is a solution (pl,  P2)  of the 
equation system 
Z(pl,  71)  =  ?, 
(1.2)  Z(p2,iT2)  = O, 
Pl  = P2 
In other words, for a confounding pair of probability arrays, there exists a single 
price vector that is an equilibrium for each of them. On the other hand, if a pair of 
probability arrays is not confounding, then any corresponding pair of equilibrium 
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It is easy to give examples of "textbook" utility functions for which confounding 
pairs of  probability arrays exist  (see  Section  2).  However,  since  the equation 
system (1.2) has more equations than unknowns, it would seem plausible that, if 
the equations were in "general position" then no solution would exist. To make 
this idea precise, assume that the set E of alternative states of the environment is 
finite; then a probability distribution on E can be represented as a point in a vector 
space of dimension  # E -  1, where  # E denotes the number of states in E (recall 
that the probabilities must sum to unity). A probability array can be represented 
by a point in a space of dimension I( # E -  1), where I  is the number of traders, 
and  the  set  Ho  of  pairs  of  probability  arrays lies  in  a  space  of  dimension 
2I( # E -  1). The equation  system (1.2) is thus parameterized by points in Ho. 
Since  asset  prices  are  relative,  it  will  be  understood  that  they  are  to  be 
normalized, say by taking the sum to be unity. Hence, if there are n assets, there 
are  (n -1)  independent  prices,  so  (1.2)  has  2(n -1)  unknowns  (for  every 
parameter point in Ho). On the other hand, there are nominally 3n equations in 
(1.2).  However,  if the utility functions are such that every budget is exhausted, 
then the value of excess  demand will always be zero,  even  out of equilibrium 
(Walras's law). Furthermore, as noted above, there are only (n -1)  independent 
prices, so the condition Pi =  P2  represents only  (n -1)  independent  equations. 
Hence there are at most 3(n -  1) independent equations in (1.2). This is still larger 
than the number of unknowns, however, so that one would not typically expect 
(1.2) to have a solution. 
Call a subset of H0 negligible if its closure has Lebesgue  measure zero. The 
auxilliary proposition gives conditions under which the set of confounding pairs of 
probability arrays  is  negligible.  In  terms  of  the  equation  system  (1.2),  this 
conclusion can be interpreted as follows. Let Co be the set of confounding pairs in 
H0, and let  C0 be  the  closure of  Co in H0. If a parameter point  is in Co (i.e. 
confounding), then every neighborhood of it has a parameter point for which (1.2) 
has no solution. In other words, for a parameter point in C0 there exist arbitrarily 
small perturbations of the system (1.2), i.e. arbitrarily small perturbations of the 
parameter point, for which the equations have no solution. On the other hand, if 
a parameter point is not in Co (and is therefore not confounding), then there is 
some neighborhood of it such that for all points in the neighborhood the system 
(1.2)  has  no  solution.  (In  addition,  there  may  be  points  of  C0 that  are  not 
confounding, i.e. not in C0.) 
In another terminology, if a property holds except on a negligible set, one says 
that  it  holds  generically. In  this  terminology,  the  conclusion  of  the  auxillary 
proposition  is that, generically, different probability arrays give rise to different 
equilibrium  prices. 
Full Communication Equilibria and Revealing Prices 
At the next stage in the analysis, I introduce the concepts of full communication 
equilibrium and revealing prices. Consider a pure exchange situation similar to 
the one just described, except that before the market activity takes place some 
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To express the idea that this information may be incomplete or noisy, let s denote 
the  information  signal,  and  suppose  that  every  trader has  a  subjective  joint 
probability distribution of the signal s and the environment e. (Strictly speaking, 
since the exogenous information signal s is also part of the traders' environment, 
one should now call e the payoff-relevant  part of the environment (see J. Marschak 
[12]),  but for simplicity I shall continue to call e the environment.)  Given the 
information signal s, each trader's preferences  among portfolios will be deter- 
mined by his conditional expected  utility, using his conditional probability dis- 
tribution of e given s. Denote trader i's conditional distribution of e given s by (the 
vector) vi,  and for each s denote the array  (vi)  of distributions,  one for each 
trader, by vT. Corresponding to each signal s, an equilibrium price vector, ps, is a 
solution of the equation system 
(1.3)  Z(ps,  5)  = 0. 
A full communication equilibrium (FCE) is mapping, X, from information signals 
to price vectors such that, for each signal s, +(s)  is an equilibrium for s, i.e.  a 
solution ps of (1.3).  (The reason for the terminology "full communication" will 
become apparent later.) I shall say that a FCE is revealing if it is one-to-one,  i.e. it 
maps different signals into distinct price vectors. (Recall that all price vectors are 
normalized.) Thus if market prices are determined by a revealing FCE, then one 
can infer the underlying signal from observing the market prices. 
Assume  that the set  S  of  alternative information signals is finite, and let  X 
denote  the  (finite) array of  probability arrays  vs.  The  set  H of  arrays X  has 
dimension  (#S)I(  #E-1).  Also,  if  S  is  finite,  the  function  X  is  actually  a 
finite-dimensional  vector,  with (#  S)n  coordinates  (where n  is the number of 
assets); because of the normalization of prices, 0  in fact lies in a set of dimension 
( # S)(n -  1). Thus a point  X  in H  is a vector of parameters for the system of 
equations 
(1.4)  Z[q(s),1s5]=O,  foreverysinS; 
this is a system of finitely many equations in finitely many unknowns. 
Observe that, for any parameter point x, every FCE is revealing if and only if, 
for every pair (s, s') of distinct signals, the pair (v5, I5s)  is not confounding. It is 
easy to check that, if a set Co(s, s') of pairs (v5,  vs,) is negligible in the correspond- 
ing space of dimension 2I( # E -  1), then the set C(s, s') of points X  in H for which 
(v5,  vs,) is in Co(s, s') is also negligible. Let C be the set of points X  in H such that, 
for some distinct s and s', the pair (v5,  vs,) is confounding. Since the set S is finite, 
and the union of finitely many negligible sets is negligible, it follows that, if for 
every distinct s and s' the set of confounding pairs is negligible, then the set C is 
also negligible.  Hence  the conclusion of the first auxillary proposition  (above) 
implies that, generically, in H, a full communication equilibrium  is revealing. 
Differential Information and Rational Expections Equilibrium 
At  the final stage in the analysis, I consider the situation in which different 
traders come to the market with possibly different exogenous information signals. 660  ROY  RADNER 
Let  si denote  the  exogenous  information  signal available  to  trader i, and let 
S  =  (si,  *,  SI)  denote the total exogenous information  available  in the market. 
Thus each trader may have only a part of the total information available. Each 
trader i has a subjective joint probability distribution of s and e. 
As a preliminary thought experiment, imagine that, given his information signal 
si, each  trader chose  among  portfolios  according to  his  conditional  expected 
utility, using his conditional  probability distribution of  e  given  si. This would 
generate an excess demand function for each trader i, given si, and thus would 
generate a total excess demand function for all traders, given s. An "exogenous 
information equilibrium" price vector, given s, would be one for which this total 
excess demand would be zero. For each s let X (s) be a corresponding exogenous 
equilibrium price vector, and suppose that every trader behaves in such a way that 
+(s) is in fact the market price if s is realized and each trader i observes si. 
Now imagine that, after a number of independent realizations of this situation, a 
particular trader, say number 1, becomes "sophisticated" and realizes that there is 
a regular relationship between the total information signal and the market price; 
this relationship is, of course, described by the mapping p.  Trader 1 would then be 
able to infer something about the total information signals from his observations 
of the market price, X (s) (unless, of course, the market price were the same for all 
s). This would change his excess demand function, since the market price would 
not only enter his budget constraint, but would also provide  a supplementary 
signal-in  addition to his exogenous signal si-on  which to condition his expected 
utility. But if his excess demand were not an insignificant part of the total, this 
"sophisticated" behavior would change the total excess  demand function, too, 
which would  change the relation  0  between  total exogenous  information and 
market price! In fact, if all traders became sophisticated in this manner, then the 
original exogenous equilibrium price vectors k  (s) would typically no longer clear 
the  market  given  the  total  exogenous  information  signal  s.  What  would  be 
required would be a "forecast function"  k that would be self-fulfilling. 
These preliminary considerations motivate the following formal definitions. A 
forecast function  X  is  a  mapping  that  associates  with  each  total  exogenous 
information signal s a price vector X (s). Given a forecast function X, suppose that 
each  trader i  chooses  among portfolios  according to  his conditional  expected 
utility given the (augmented) information [si, k(s)]. 
This behavior will generate,  for each total signal and each trader an excess 
demand; call the resulting total excess demand the sophisticated excess demand. It 
should  be  emphasized  that this sophisticated  excess  demand  depends  on  the 
forecast function  X  and on the particular total signal s; denote  it by ;(s,  k). A 
rational  expectations  equilibrium  (REE)  is  a  forecast  function  such  that  the 
corresponding sophisticated  excess demand is zero for every total information 
signal, i.e. a function  k such that 
(1.5)  ;(s, q)  = O,  for all s in S. 
Note  that sophisticated demand behavior requires the knowledge  of the entire 
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the equation system (1.5) is a system of simultaneous equations in the values of the 
function q. 
We  can now  see  the  connection  between  full  communication  and rational 
expectations equilibria. Consider a FCE  k based on the total information signals. 
In our present terminology,  the FCE  k is a particular forecast function. Recall 
that  k is revealing if it is one-to-one.  Suppose that the FCE were revealing; then 
for every trader and every total information signal s, the conditional probability 
distribution of  e  given  4(s)  would  be the same  as the conditional  probability 
distribution of e given s. Hence the sophisticated demand of trader i given si and 
+ (s) would equal his ordinary demand given s. By the equilibrium property of X, 
the ordinary total excess demand, given that every trader knows s and that the 
price vector is + (s), is zero. It follows that the FCE X  is a forecast function that 
satisfies (1.5). Thus we see  that a revealing full communication equilibrium is a 
rational expectations equilibrium. 
One can now state the main result about REE's as a corollary of the preceding 
observation and the auxillary proposition: Under the assumptions of the auxillary 
proposition,  generically, there exists a  rational expectations equilibrium that is 
revealing. 
In Section 2, I provide a simple example that illustrates the concepts and the 
main results. Section 3 contains a systematic presentation of all of the results and 
their proofs. In the course of proving the main results, it is necessary to prove that 
the excess demand function is generically differentiable in prices and parameters 
at equilibrium (Lemma 1); the method used may be applicable to other models. 
The assumptions are discussed in some detail in Section 4. 
2.  AN  EXAMPLE 
An example in which the equilibrium can be explicitly calculated illustrates the 
6  problems that will be considered in subsequent sections. 
Suppose that there are only two assets being traded. Trader i's initial endow- 
ment will be denoted  by  wi = (ti, vi) and his final portfolio  by xi = (yi, zi).  The 
(normalized) price vector is p = (q, 1 -  q). Suppose further that trader i's utility 
function is of the "Cobb-Douglas"  form: 
(2.1)  ui(xi,  ai)  ai  log yi +(1-ai)  log zi,  0<ai  <  1. 
First consider the case of equilibrium with certainty. It is easily verified that, if 
trader i chooses xi to maximize the utility (2.1) subject to 
(2.2)  Yi  ?,  zi ;  0, 
qyi  +  (1 -q)  zi  s~  qti +  (1 -q)  Vi, 
6 Strictly speaking,  this example  is not a special  case of the model  of Section  3.  However,  the 
simplicity of the formulas for equilibrium prices makes it useful for exposition. 662  ROY  RADNER 
then his demand, as a function of the price vector, is 
aiWi  (1-ai)Wi 
yi=  q  ,  1-q 
(2.3)q  23) 
Wi--=qti  +  (1 -q)  vi. 
For an equilibrium, excess demand equals zero: 
(2.4)  (yi  - ti)  =  (zi - vi) =  O. 
i  i 
The solution, for q, of (2.3) and (2.4) is 
Z aivi 
(2.5)  q  [aivi + (1-  ai)ti] 
Now  suppose  that there are two alternative states of the environment,  with 
respective probabilities  f' and  f";  '  +  f"  = 1. The parameter of trader i's utility 
function may depend on the state of the environment; let a( and a'! denote the two 
respective  values of ai. If trader i does  not know the state of the environment 
when he makes his purchase decision, then he will maximize his expected utility 
(2.6)  ui  (xi, di) = di  log Yi  + (1-  i) log zi, 
where 
(2.7)  ci-  qf'a  +qfa'i- 
I now consider three types of equilibrium. First, if every trader knows the state 
of the environment when he makes his purchase decision, then in each state there 
will be an equilibrium. Denote  the respective  equilibrium prices by q' and q"; 
these are obtained from (2.5) by letting ai equal ai  and a ', respectively. Call these 
the full communication equilibrium  prices. 
Second, let (J, K) be a partition of the traders into two sets, such that at the time 
of purchase, traders in J (the "informed" traders) know the state of the environ- 
ment, and traders in K  (the "uninformed" traders) do not. The resulting equili- 
brium prices in the two states will be 
Z avi  +  E  aivi 
-,  iEsJ  iEK 
q  =  Z  [a!'vi + (1 - a')ti]  +  E  [civi + (1-  i ti] 
iieJ  ijeK 
(2.8) 
aivi +  ?  aiVi 
ie J  jeK 
q  [a,'vi + (1-a!)ti]  +  E  [ivi  + (1-di)ti] 
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Call these the unsophisticated equilibrium  prices. Note  that this includes the full 
communication equilibrium as a special case, when K  is empty. 
To  introduce  the  third equilibrium concept,  imagine  that in the process  of 
approaching the  second  equilibrium by means  of  a tatonnement  process,  the 
uninformed traders realize that the equilibrium price should reflect the informa- 
tion  that the  informed  traders possess.  The  possibility  of  inferring something 
about the informed traders' information from the market price rests, of course, on 
knowing how the market price would differ in the two states of the environment, 
but this relationship is endogenous  to the market system. Thus, define the third 
equilibrium as a pair of prices, say (q', q"),  such that if every trader expects q' to be 
the market price in state  1 and q" to be the price in state 2, and if each trader 
maximizes his conditional expected  utility, conditioned  on both his own initial 
information and the market price, then excess demand will be zero in each state. 
Call this a rational expectations equilibrium. 
In this example there are two possibilities for a rational expectations  equili- 
brium (q', q"):  either (i) q' and q"  are unequal, or (ii) they are equal. In the first case 
initially uninformed traders (those in K)  can infer the state of the environment 
from the market price, so that, conditional on the market  price, all traders become 
informed.  In  this  case,  I  shall  say  that  the  equilibrium prices  are  revealing. 
Therefore in case (i) 
(2.9)  q'=  q  q  q"  =  q  "q  ; 
the equilibrium prices must be the same as those in the first, full communication 
equilibrium. 
In the second case, initially uninformed traders cannot infer the state of the 
environment from the market price, so that, conditional on the market price, each 
trader's information is the same as in the unsophisticated equilibrium, (2.8). Thus 
case (ii) is characterized by 
(2.10)  q'= 4',  q"= 4", q'=  q". 
Which of these two cases is possible (if any) depends on the parameters of the 
model, (a'), (a"),  f', and (J,  K), which  in turn  determine  q', q",  q', and 4".  The 
possible  rational expectations  equilibria are summarized in the two-way  table 
(Table I). The four cells of the table are labelled with Roman numerals. A rational 
TABLE  I 
RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  EQUILIBRIA 
ql  "  4qll  qlA=  qN 
Al~~~~ ~  ~~~ ~  Alt 
Al,A,,  q'  q"  (', q")  and 
(I)  (II) 
q' =  q"  none  (4', q") 
(III)  (IV) 664  ROY  RADNER 
expectations equilibrium exists in all cases except III, and is unique in I and IV. 
If we fix the partition (J, K)  of agents into initially informed and uninformed 
traders, then there are (2I + 1) remaining (real-valued) parameters, all of which 
are constrained to be between 0 and 1. Cases II and III each correspond to a single 
equation and a single inequality, and case IV corresponds to two equations. For 
example, case III corresponds to the equality 
Z  [c  lv  + (1 - a/)ti]  E [a!4vi  + (1 - a!)ti] 
(cf. (2.5)), together with the inequality 
(2.12)  4'?7q", 
which I do not write out in full (cf. (2.8)). Equation (2.11) determines, in general, a 
manifold of dimension 2I in the parameter space, and inequality (2.12) excludes 
from  that  manifold  a submanifold  of  dimension  (2I -  1).  Thus  case  III  cor- 
responds to a subset of the parameter space that essentially has dimension 2I, one 
less than the dimension of the entire parameter space. Continuing in this way, we 
may describe the four regions in the parameter space, corresponding to the four 
cells in Table I, as in Table II. 
TABLE II 
Rational Expectations 
Case  Conditions  Dimension  Equilibria 
I  q'#4"  2I+1  1 
q' #  1" 
II  4'#q"  2I  2 
III  q'=  q"  2I  0 
IV  q '=q  2I-1  1 
q  =qn 
Thus, except for a closed set of Lebesque measure zero in the parameter space, a 
rational  expectations equilibrium (REE)  exists,  is  unique,  and  is  identical  in 
outcomes with the  full communication equilibria.  The sets for which no REE exists 
(III) and two REE  exist  (IV) are each of dimension  one  less than that of the 
parameter space, and the set for which the unique equilibrium does not reveal the 
state of the environment to the initially uninformed traders is "least likely" of all, 
having dimension two less than that of the parameter space. 
In a more general setting,  each trader would  have some  initial information 
about the environment, and the market price would depend at most on the initial 
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communication equilibria would be equilibria in which all traders were provided 
in common  all the information that was jointly available to them initially; call 
these also full communication equilibria.  The analysis of this example suggests the 
conjecture7 that, under much more general conditions, a REE will have the same 
outcomes  as the full communication equilibria, except for a "small" set in the 
space of parameters of the market system. This conjecture is proved in Section 3, 
in the  context  of  a more  general  model,  under the  condition  that the  set  of 
alternative states of initial information is finite. 
3.  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  AND  FULL  COMMUNICATION  EQUILIBRIA 
In this section I show that, in the context of a particular model of asset trading, 
the existence  of a rational expectations  equilibrium that is also a revealing full 
communication equilibrium is generic. In other words, except for a negligible set 
of points in the parameter space of the economy, rational expectations equilibria 
exist that reveal to all traders all the available information. 
Consider a pure exchange economy  with I  traders. Trader i chooses  (ci, zi), 
where ci = i's expenditure on current consumption, and zi = i's portfolio, with K 
different assets. Thus ci is a nonnegative  real number, and zi is a nonnegative 
K-dimensional  vector. The value of one unit of asset k next period will be  v 
however, at the time of the current market traders are uncertain about the vector 
v =  (v  k) of future asset values. The vector v can take on one of finitely many values 
Ve,  e in E;  call e the payoff-relevant environment. If trader i chooses  (c, z),  and 
environment  e obtains, then the future value of his portfolio  will be the inner 
product8 v'z;  assume that the utility of this outcome  to him is Uoi(c) + Ui(v'z). 
We may interpret Ui(y) as the indirect utility of starting next period with wealth y. 
Before  making  any  trade,  each  trader  i  has  available  exogenously  some 
information, si, a point in a finite set Si. I shall call si the signal received by trader i, 
and the I-tuple s = (si,  . . . , sI)  the joint  signal.  Let S denote the (finite) set of all 
joint  signals. Each  trader i  has a probability distribution on  E x S. Different 
traders may have different beliefs about the joint distribution Qi of e and s. 
I shall later postulate conditions that will guarantee that at equilibrium all prices 
are positive.  Therefore,  it is legitimate to normalize prices so that the price of 
current consumption is 1; let q denote the vector of asset prices. 
Finally, let wi denote trader i's vector of initial endowments. We may interpret 
the first coordinate of coi  as i's endowment of "cash." If the coordinates of coi  are 
numbered 0, . ..  , K, and wi-(G  ,...  ,  ()  (i's  asset endowment), then trader i's 
budget constraint is 
(3.1)  ci + q 'zi :  cl)  z+  q'wi  Wi. 
7 As far as I know, this idea is essentially due to Michael Rothschild. 
? Vectors will ordinarily be understood to be columns, and their transpose will be denoted  by a 
prime. N-dimensional Euclidean space will be denoted by RN,  its nonnegative orthant by R+N,  and its 
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Before  formally  specifying  each  trader's  behavior,  let  ei4,  (q)  provisionally 
denote trader i's demand, given the asset price vector q, and his signal si, and let 
Z,(q)  provisionally denote  the total market excess demand for assets. Suppose 
that every trader's demand satisfies his budget constraint (3.1) with equality; then, 
by Walras's Law, zero excess demand for assets implies zero excess demand for 
current consumption. Therefore, q is an equilibrium (asset) price vector, given s, if 
Z.(q)=O. 
Suppose that there were a rule for choosing a single equilibrium q in the case of 
multiple equilibria; then for every s there would be a well-defined  equilibrium 
price vector, say qs = 4 (s). In this circumstance, any trader knowing the  function k 
would be able to infer that s is in the inverse image, +k  (q), of q, and might be 
expected to evaluate his expected utility conditional both on si and on s in +-l(q). 
This motivates the following  definition of rational expectations  equilibrium. 
Call a function from S to R  a forecast function. Given a forecast function X, and 
given  a price vector  q  and a joint  signal s, trader i's  demand  is a (c, z)  that 
maximizes his conditional expected utility 
(3.2)  921{U,o(c)+  Ui(v'z)Isi,  s in +-(q)}, 
subject to the budget constraint (3.1). Let eij(q,  k)  denote i's demand for assets; 
the total excess demand for assets is 
(3.3)  ZS,(q,  X-  fs(q,  )-wi] 
A rational expectations equilibrium (REE)  is a forecast function X5*  such that 
(3.4)  Z,[,b*(s),  4*]  = O,  every s in S. 
Note that (3.4) is a set of simultaneous equations in all of the values of the forecast 
function  0*. 
Full Communication Equilibria 
I shall now propose a candidate for a rational expectations equilibrium. Imagine 
that before entering the market the traders exchange all their signal information, 
so that every trader knows s. Let +(s)  denote an ordinary equilibrium price vector 
given s, i.e. a price vector for which excess demand would be zero if each trader 
maximized  conditional  expected  utility given  s.  Call  X  a full  communication 
equilibrium (FCE).  (Actually, q0  is a family of equilibrium price vectors, one for 
each joint signal s.) Call q revealing if different joint signals s result in different 
equilibrium price vectors + (s), i.e. 
(3.5)  s $  s'  implies  +(s)  5  A  (s'). 
It is immediate that if q is a FCE and satisfies (3.5), then it satisfies (3.4). Thus, a 
full communication equilibrium that is revealing is a rational expectations equili- 
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With this observation  in mind, let us turn to the examination  of conditions 
under  which  a  FCE  is  revealing.  For  any  trader  i,  any  joint  signal  s,  and 
environment  e, let  11ise  denote  i's  conditional  probability of  e, given  s;  let  uris 
denote the probability vector with coordinates (ITise);  let 7Tr  denote the array  (7Tis), 
i = 1, . . . , I;  and let  7r denote9  the  array (7-rs). Given  s, trader i's  conditional 
expected utility of the pair (c, z) is 
(3.6)  Uoi(c)  +  7riseUi(VeZ). 
e 
Therefore,  in  a FCE,  trader  i's  conditional  expected  utility  of  (c, z)  given  s 
depends on s only through the probability vector 7ris,  and total excess demand in 
the market depends  on s  only through the array 7rs. To emphasize this, I shall 
denote this excess demand by Z(q,  -rs). 
With  this  notation,  a  FCE  is  a  solution,  (qs), of  the  following  system  of 
equations: 
(3.7)  Z(qs, 'rS) = 0,  for all s in S. 
(Note  that, for each s, the equation for qs can be solved by itself.) The FCE is 
revealing if all of the price vectors qs are distinct. 
Let H denote  the set of all probability arrays 7r  = (7-rs).  Call a subset C of H 
negligible if the closure of C has Legesgue measure zero in H. I wish to show that 
the set of points  7r in H for which there is no corresponding revealing FCE is 
negligible.  It will then follow  that, except for a negligible set of points in H, a 
revealing rational expectations equilibrium exists. Actually I shall prove a some- 
what stronger statement about FCE's, namely, that the set of points in H for which 
there exists some nonrevealing FCE is negligible. 
The proof rests on three assumptions, which I now introduce and motivate. 
The first two assumptions guarantee that full communication equilibria exist, 
that demands are single-valued (as opposed to set-valued), and that in equilibrium 
every trader's current consumption is strictly positive.10 
(Al)  For every  trader i,  Uoi and  Ui  are twice  continuously  differentiable, 
strictly increasing, and strictly concave; furthermore,  Ui  (c) tends to  +oo as c 
tends to zero. 
(A2)  For every i, coi  > 0; further, Xi coi  >>  0. 
The third assumption concerns the (future) values of the alternative assets in the 
several states of the environment. Part (a) requires that there be more states of the 
environment  than there  are assets,  that the  set  of  future-value  vectors  Ve be 
sufficiently varied, and that every asset have a strictly positive future value in every 
state. Part (b) rules out the situation in which the marginal utility of a small change 
in a portfolio would be the same in all states (at equilibrium). 
9 Warning: the symbol  7r  will always be used to denote  an array of probability vectors,  but at 
different points in the paper the arrays may be of different dimension. The proper dimension of 7r  will, 
of course, be indicated in each context. 
10 For a vector or matrix x, x  0  0 means that every element of x is nonnegative; x > 0 means that 
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(A3)  (a) E  has more than K  elements  (##E>K),  every set of K  vectors  ve 
spans RK, and every ve >>  0; (b) at equilibrium, for every i, there exists no x in R K 
such that for every e (v  x)U  (v'zi) = 1. 
In particular part (b) of (A3) rules out the logarithmic utility function  U1(y)= 
log y. It will be shown to follow from part (a) that the expected utility function is 
strictly concave in the portfolio vector z. 
Equilibrium under Uncertainty is Sensitive to the Probabilities 
The proof that, generically, a FCE is revealing can be based on an, auxillary 
proposition  about  ordinary  equilibrium  under  uncertainty,  which  has  some 
independent  interest.  Let  irr and  T2  be two probability arrays in PI  where P 
denotes  the  set  of  all  probability  vectors  (pe),  i.e.  the  set  of  all  probability 
distributions on E. Looking at the system of equations (3.7),  one sees that one 
wants conditions under which the following system has no solution: 
Z(ql,  7Ta) =  0, 
(3.8)  Z(q2,  iT2)  =  0, 
ql  =q2- 
A pair (7T1, 72)  for which (3.8) does have a solution will be called confounding. In 
other words, if two probability arrays are not confounding, then in any pair of 
corresponding equilibria the equilibrium price vectors are distinct. 
PROPOSITION:  If  assumptions  (A1)-(A3)  are satisfied, then the set of con- 
founding pairs (lri,  12)  is negligible in p2I. 
PROOF: First note that the set P+ of strictly  positive points in P is open and has 
full measure in P. Hence  it is sufficient to show that the set Co of confounding 
points in p2+I is negligible in the following sense: Co has Legesgue measure zero in 
p2I  , and is relatively closed in p2I  (the intersection of CO  with any closed subset of 
p?2I  is closed). 
I next investigate some properties of an individual trader's demand. For a trader 
with probability vector  (pe),  his expected utility is (I suppress the index i): 
(3.9)  Uo(c) + E PU(vez). 
e 
Here  UO(c)  is the utility from current consumption, and 
U(z)  -  peU(Vez) 
e 
is the expected utility from the portfolio. 
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respectively, 
(3.10)  DU(z)  =ZpeU'(Vez)ve, 
e 
(3.1 1)  D2U(z)  =  Pe U"(VeZ)  VeVe. 
e 
First, since U'>  0 and, for every e, Pe > 0 and Ve >>  0, 
(3.12)  DU(z)  >>  0. 
Second, since  U" < 0 and the vectors Ve span RK 
(3.13)  D2U(z)<<  0  and is negative definite. 
Also,  both DU  and D2U  are continuous. 
By (3.12) and (3.13),  U is strictly increasing and strictly concave in z. Also,  UO  is 
strictly increasing and strictly concave in c. Hence, for any given positive prices, a 
trader's demand will be unique, and the budget constraint will be satisfied with 
equality. 
I now turn to the study of the properties of total excess demand. I normalize the 
price of consumption to be unity. Since every individual trader's budget constraint 
is satisfied with equality, the value of total excess demand for assets and current 
consumption  is zero,  and an equilibrium for the  probability array 7r in PI  is 
characterized by Z(q,  7rr)  = 0. By standard methods one can show that equilibrium 
exists. In equilibrium, all asset prices will be strictly positive. 
With the present model,  an individual's demand function need not be every- 
where differentiable in prices and probabilities. By Assumption  (A2),  at equili- 
brium the total demand for every asset is positive, but a particular  trader's demand 
for a particular asset could be zero. In such a case, his demand for that asset would 
typically have  a discontinuity  in the  derivative  with respect  to  prices  and/or 
probabilities at a point at which the demand for that asset just falls to zero. We 
shall see that the set of points in PI  at which this can happen in equilibrium is 
negligible. 
LEMMA  1: There  is an open subset .  of PI  whose complement in PI  has Legesgue 
measure zero, and such that, for every rr  in .  and every corresponding  equilibrium 
price vector q, the excess demand function Z is continuously differentiable  in both 
arguments in a neighborhood of (q, 7rr). 
(The proof of Lemma 1 will be deferred to the end of this section.) 
To  continue  with the proof  of  the  Proposition,  define  the mapping F  from 
L=R2K+  X&(2  to R3K  by 
Z (q-q,  7i 
(3.14)  F(qi,  q2,  '7T1 1 r2)3  Z(q2,  1r2). 
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Let M be the set points  (ql,  q2,  7T,  772)  in L at which F is zero. In terms of M, a pair 
(l71,  772)  in  & iS  confounding  if  and  only  if  there  exists  (ql,  q2)  such  that 
(qi,  q2,  'I,  7T2)  is in M. In other words, the set of confounding pairs (771, 772)  in  &2 
is the coordinate projection of M in .Y2. 
By Lemma 1, F is continuously differentiable in an open set, say Lo, containing 
M. 
LEMMA  2: At every point of M, the Jacobian J of F has rank 3K. 
(The proof of Lemma 2 will be deferred to the end of this section.) 
To continue with the proof of the Proposition, note that the dimension of gy2  iS 
d  2I( # E -  1), and so the dimension of Lo is 2K + d. Hence, by Lemma 2, M is a 
differentiable  manifold1" of  dimension  (2K +d-3K)  =  d-K.  Let  T  be  the 
coordinate-projection mapping from M into g12.  Since T is differentiable, and the 
dimension of M is strictly less then the dimension of  y2,  the image T(M)  under T 
has measure zero12 in g2.  One can show that there is a compact subset, say Q, of 
R21  such that M  is contained in Q X ,2.  Since Z  is continuous on all of L, it 
follows easily that T(M) is relatively closed in g2*  Hence T(M) is negligible in Y  2 
But T(M)  is exactly the set of confounding pairs in  .2*  By Lemma A,  2 is open 
and of full measure in p2+I  . Hence the set of confounding pairs in p2I  is negligible 
in p2I.  This completes the proof of the Proposition. 
Recall that H is the set of all probability arrays (Trise). 
COROLLARY:  Except for a negligible subset C of H, for every  probability  array in 
H every corresponding  full communication equilibrium is revealing. 
(I omit the proof of the Corollary; see the Introduction.) 
The main theorem is now an immediate consequence  of the Corollary and the 
observation that every revealing FCE is a REE. 
THEOREM:  Except for a negligible subset C of H, for every  probability  array in H 
there is a corresponding  rational expectations equilibrium that is revealing. 
Note  that the Theorem does not exclude the possibility that there are points 
both in C and outside it that have a nonrevealing REE. 
PROOF  OF  LEMMA  1: The  technique  is  similar to  that  used  to  prove  the 
Proposition. 13 First we need a precise statement of conditions for equilibrium. For 
each  trader let  -rr  (rrie)  denote  his vector  of  probabilities  of  payoff-relevant 
environments e. As before, let q denote  the vector of asset prices. Given q >>  0, 
See Sternberg [16, Chapter II, p. 47, Exercise 3.5]. 
12  See Sternberg [16, Chapter II, p. 47, Exercise 3.4]. 
13  The idea of using this general method to prove the generic differentiability of the excess demand 
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each trader i will use all of his budget, so his expected  utility associated with a 
portfolio zi is 
(3.15)  V (zi)  Uio(w? + q'wi-q  'zi)+  7Tie  Ui(VZi), 
where  wi,  (w?,  wi)  is his initial endowment.  The  constraints on  his portfolio 
choice are: 
(3.16)  zi  0. 
(3.  17)  ?  + q'wi -q'zi ;o 0. 
Since the marginal utility of period-zero consumption is infinite at zero consump- 
tion (Al),  the second of the above constraints will not be binding. Hence, the first 
order conditions for a trader's demand are 
(3.18)  DVi(z&)!O,  zjO0,  zDVi(zj)=0, 
where D denotes the vector of first  derivatives (these conditions are necessary and 
sufficient). Let  Vik(zi)  denote the k'th coordinate of DVi(zi);  then an equivalent 
way of writing (3.18) is 
zi  0, 
(3.19)  z  > 0  implies  Vik(Zi)  =  , 
zE=0  implies  Vik(Zi)  4O? 
The demand zk can fail to be differentiable in q and/or iri only in the case in which 
both Zi' = 0 and Vik(Zi)  =  - 
For equilibrium, we add the condition that total excess demand for assets be 
zero: 
(3.20)  E  (zi -  wi) = 0. 
i 
For any array (iri) in pI,  an equilibrium is an (I + 1)-tuple (z1, . . . , zI, q) satisfying 
(3.19)  and (3.20).  Let N  denote  the set of points in PI  for which there exists a 
corresponding equilibrium such that for some trader i and asset k 
(3.21)  z  =O  and  Vik(Zi)=O? 
To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show that N  is negligible in PI+. Actually, I 
shall show that N  is contained in a larger set, N*,  which is also negligible. To 
define  N*,  for  every  trader  i  let  J(i  by  any  (possibly  empty)  subset  of  the 
commodities  1,  .  , K, and consider the following equations: 
Vik (Zi)  =  0,  for all k in Xi, 
(32  = 0,  for all k not in 17i. 
If (ri)  is in N, then there is an associated equilibrium, and sets Y(,, . ..  , J4,, such 
that (3.20)  is satisfied, (3.22)  is satisfied for all i, and in addition there is some 
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following definition; in this definition I show explicitly that Vik  (zi) depends also on 
q and iri. For any sets X1, . . . , 9J4,  any one trader j, and any commodity n in Xi?,  let 
N* (.711,..  I, j, n)  be  the  set  of  points  (-re) in  PI  such  that  the  following 
equations have a solution in zi,...  ,  ZI,  q: 
(z  -  Wk)  =  0, 
(3.23)  lkl(zi  q  i)  ,  k in  a  i, 
z k =0,  k not in Xi 
Zi  0. 
Further,  define  N*  to  be  the  union  of  all  the  (finitely  many)  sets 
N* (,71  ,  .  .v 9G,  j, n); then N  is a subset of N*.  To show that N*  is negligible, it 
suffices to show that each N*(7(1,...  .,  .2f, j, n) is negligible. 
To  that  end,  fix  Xl,  ...  , JI,  j,  and  n  (with  n  in  .7j),  and  let  G  be  the 
mapping from  L*-R(I+1)K  =P  to  R(I?l)K?l  whose  value  at  a  point 
(z1,  * *  .  I z,, q, iTi, . . .,  IT)  in L* is given by the left side of (3.23). Let M* be the 
set of points in L* at which G is zero.  G is clearly continuously differentiable. I 
shall show that the Jacobian of G has rank (I + 1)K + 1 at every point of M*. With 
this fact, and an argument just like that used to prove the Proposition, it follows 
that M* is a differentiable manifold of dimension equal to dim (HI')  -  1, and hence 
that the coordinate projection of M* in P'  is negligible. 
To show that J(G),  the Jacobian of G, has full rank, I start by displaying a block 
decomposition  of J(G)  in the following table, where the rows correspond to the 
lines of (3.23), and the columns to z1, ... .  z.,  q,  1,  . *.  ,  erk.  The symbol 1 denotes 
the K x K identity matrix, and the symbol n denotes the n 'th unit vector (column) 
in R K  For simplicity, and without loss of generality, I take j=  1. 
Z1  ...  ZI  q  I1  . . .  TI 
1  ...  1  0  0  ...  0 
A1  0  C1  B1  0 
(3.24) 
0  A,  C,  0  *BI 
n'  0 ...  0  0  0  ...  0 
I want to show that the set of all linear combinations of the columns of J(G)  that 
can be obtained by admissible variations in the vectors zi, q, and 7ri  span R(I+l)K+l. 
Note that, by the definition of the mapping G, the vectors zi and q vary in R K  but 
each vector vi varies in P+. Hence,  any "differential" d7ri  of 7r must satisfy 
(3.25)  X dirie, =  . 
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Consider first a matrix Bi; its elements are given by 
h  AVih  =U  (Vz)vh  hE AE  (3.26)  Bie=1  a -Tie 
O,  hiXi 
Define X to be the set of all vectors x = Bi,f  such that f8  = (P3e)  satisfies Xe P3e  = 0. X 
clearly is contained in Ki, the coordinate subspace of R K  corresponding to the 
commodities  in 94. I shall now show that X  spans Ki. If not, there would be a 
vector  #  ?0  in  Ki  orthogonal  to  X;  in  other  words  Xe P3e  =0  would  imply 
'BiP = 0. This would imply that all of the coordinates of V'Bi  would be equal, i.e. 
that all of the numbers .VveU!  (v'zi)  would be equal; but this would contradict part 
(b)  of  Assumption  (A3).  (Note  that  XVveU! (v'z1)  > 0,  since  x ? 0  and 
UI (VWzi)ve >>  0.)  Hence,  X  spans  Ki. 
Let Bi denote the matrix of columns of J(G)  corresponding to 7Ti,  and let B be 
the subspace of R(I+l)K+l  spanned by all vectors of the form Xi BIif  such that, for 
each i, Xe P3ie  = 0. From what has just been shown in the preceding paragraph, B  is 
a coordinate subspace of R (I+1)K+lI  isomorphic to the product of the Ki, and of 
dimension Xi ( #  J4). It remains to find additional columns of J(G)  that, together 
with B,  span R(I+l)K+l.  This can be done by selecting a set of columns of J(G) 
corresponding to z1, . . . , zI.  I omit the details. 
PROOF  OF  LEMMA  2: The technique is similar to that used in Lemma 1. Recall 
that the mapping F is defined by (3.14). The notation will be slightly different from 
that  used  in  Lemma  1.  The  vectors  qS(s  =  1, 2)  denote  the  price  vectors  cor- 
responding  to  the  two  signals,  and  7rs is  the  array  (TTise) of  probabilities,  with 
le  vTise  = 1, all  s,  i. A  block  decomposition  of  the  Jacobian  J(F)  is shown  in the 
following table, where the rows correspond to the coordinates of the value of F, 
and  the  columns  to  q1,  q2,  rri, and  172. Again,  the  symbol  1 denotes  the  K  x K 
identity matrix. 
ql  q2  T1  72 
A1  0  B1  0 
(3.27) 
0  A2  0  B2 
1  -1  0  0 
(The symbols As and Bs will have different meanings than in Lemma 1.) I want to 
show that the set of all linear combinations of the columns of (3.27) that can be 
obtained by admissible variations in ql, q2,  rri, and 72 span R 3K.  Recall that q, 
and q2 are each in R +K, and -rr and 72 are each in @.  Any "differential" d7rs  of 7rs 
must satisfy 
(3.28)  Z  d7Tise  =  0,  all s,  i. 
This motivates the following language: I shall say that a submatrix of the part of 
J(F)  corresponding to -rr and 72 has rank r if the set of linear combinations of the 674  ROY  RADNER 
columns of that submatrix whose coefficients satisfy (3.28)  spans a subspace of 
dimension r. 
First, the  columns  corresponding  to  q,  are independent  and have  rank K, 
because  of  the  identity  block  at the  bottom,  and are also  independent  of  all 
columns corresponding to  Iri and V2.  Second, the columns corresponding to  ITt 
are independent of the columns corresponding to  T2.  Hence it is sufficient to show 
that B1 and B2  each have rank K. 
Each matrix B,  is composed  of I  groups of  columns; each group i forms a 
submatrix, the Jacobian of i's excess demand function with respect to 7is, which is 
equal  to  the  corresponding  Jacobian  of  i's  gross  demand  function,  since  the 
endowment of i (given s) is fixed. 
Consider the first-order conditions for a particular trader's optimal demand, 
(c, z), given an asset price vector q >>  0, and given the trader's probability vector 
P  (Pe)  i'sj >>  0. To simplify the notation, I shall suppress the indices i and s. Let 
Ye=vez  (the value of the portfolio z in state e). The first-order conditions for the 
optimal (c, z) are given by (3.19), which I rewrite here as 
zBO, 
(3.29)  zk>0  implies  Vk(z)=O, 
zk=0  implies  Vk(z)  O, 
where 
V(z  U(c)  + E Pe U(Ye) 
e 
(3.30)  c = wo+q'w  -q'z, 
Ye =  Vez, 
and  Vk  is the partial derivative of  V with respect to  Zk  (taking account of the 
dependence  of c and Ye  on z). These partial derivatives are given by 
(3.31)  Vk  (z) =-UO  (c)q  +  peU'(ye)Ve 
e 
Since p is in  i,  it follows from the way 9  was constructed in Lemma 1 that the 
third line of (3.29) can be sharpened to read: 
(3.32)  Zk =  o  implies  Vk(z) < O. 
As in the proof of Lemma 1, let .7((=.7()  be the set of assets such that z k > 0. 
We shall think of z, c, and Ye as functions of p. Let / be a particular state of the 
environment;  if we  differentiate  the  first order  conditions  (3.29)-(3.32)  with 
respect to pf we get 
(DVk(z))(z-)  +  U'(yf)Vk  = 0,  k E YC, 
(3.33)  dZk 
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One easily verifies that 
D2  V(z)  =D2U(z)+  U+(c)qq3Q. 
It has already been noted, in (3.13), that D2 U(z)  is negative definite. Therefore, 
since U"(c)qq' is negative semidefinite, Q is negative definite, and hence nonsin- 
gular. Let QO be the square submatrix obtained from Q by deleting the rows and 
columns  corresponding  to  assets  k  not  in  7,  and let  zX  and  v  '  be  similarly 
defined. Then one can rewrite (3.33) as 
Q(aZ  =U(yf)vf 
azk 
-=0  for  k/(.  apf 
Hence 
(ii  jf)  =  (QXflU'(yf)V{f 
(3.34)  aZk 
a-  0,  for  k  J(.  apf 
By  the  argument used  in Lemma  1, the  following  equation  (3.26),  the set  of 
vectors 
{  E 3U'(yf)VZ:  E f  = 0} 
is  a  linear  space  of  dimension  #J(.  Hence  the  Jacobian  (az/ap)  spans  the 
coordinate subspace of RK  corresponding to assets in Y.7  For trader i, call this 
subspace  ei. 
One then repeats this argument for another trader whose equilibrium portfolio 
includes an asset not demanded by trader i. One continues in this way until all 
assets have been accounted for, which must eventually happen because the total 
K 
demand for every asset is positive. Thus the subspaces ti  will span R 
4.  COMMENTS  ON  THE  ASSUMPTIONS 
The  basic  proposition  of  this  paper  is  that  generically,  i.e.,  except  for  a 
negligible set of economies that satisfy the assumptions of the model, there exists a 
rational expectations equilibrium whose prices are "revealing," i.e. reveal to all 
market agents all the information initially available to all the agents. My com- 
ments on the assumptions address two issues: (i) Does Assumption 3 characterize 
a set of economies whose complement is negligible in the broader set of economies 
that otherwise fit the formulation of the model and satisfy Assumptions  1 and 2? 
(ii) How important is the requirement of the model that the sets of information 
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To begin the discussion of the first issue, let me recall that there are really two 
sets of assumptions. One set is implicit in the formulation of the model, the other is 
described in Assumptions 1-3. Given the formulation of the model, the following 
objects comprise the data of a particular economy: 
(1)  (a) The finite number I of traders, and the finite number K of assets; (b) the 
traders' utility functions,  Uoi and Ui, and their endowments, wi. 
(2)  The finite number, say H, of alternative payoff-relevant environments, and 
the  finite  numbers  of  alternative  information  signals  in  the  several  traders 
information sets, say J1, ..  .,  Ji. 
(3)  The array (ve)  of vectors of eventual  asset values in the several environ- 
ments. 
(4)  The array 7r  of conditional probabilities TTise. 
Thus, within the model, an economy is characterized by an array 
[I, K, (Uoi, Ui, Wli)q  H, (Ji),  (Ve),  (Trise)l 
Let A  denote the set of economies. 
If one fixes the number of traders, their utility functions and endowments, and 
the  numbers of  environments  and signals,  then  one  obtains  a smaller set  of 
economies,  say A'.  (The set A' depends, of course, on the just-mentioned  data, 
and should really be written as 
A'[I, K, (Uoi, Ui, wti),  H, (Ji)].) 
Within any fixed set A', an economy is characterized by the array  [(Ve),  (OTise)].  Let 
V denote the set of all nonnegative arrays (Ve),  given K and H, and let H7  denote 
the set of all nonnegative arrays (Tise)  such that 
E  Tise=  1,  for all i and s. 
e 
Then  V  has dimension  K x H,  H  has dimension  I(H  -  l)J1 x...  x Ji,  and an 
economy in (a fixed set) A' is characterized by a point in V x H. 
Let A' be fixed with H > K. The first thing to note is that the set of arrays (Ve) 
satisfying Assumption A3 (a) is open and of full measure in V. Hence, if H > K, the 
set of economies not satisfying Assumption A 3(a)  is negligible in A'. 
Turning to Assumption A3(b), one would hope that, with additional regularity 
conditions on the utility functions, this assumption would be satisfied for all but a 
negligible set of economies in any given set A' (provided H > K and Assumptions 
Al  and A2  are also satisfied). However, I have no result of this kind at present. 
To  conclude  the  discussion  of  the  first issue,  let  me  suggest  that for some 
purposes the model has allowed the set H of arrays  (iTise)  to be too large. Suppose 
that all traders agree on the conditional probabilities of  (joint) signals s  given 
environments  e,  but  have  possibly  different  "prior"  probabilities  for  the 
environments.  In  this  case  the  dimension  of  H  would  be  smaller,  and  the 
demonstration that a set is negligible in H would be a sharper result. RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  EQUILIBRIUM  677 
I turn now to the second issue: is it important that the sets of information signals 
be  finite?  The  first thing  to  note  is  that  one  cannot  expect  in  general  that 
equilibrium prices will be revealing if the signal sets are "too large." For example, 
if the  sets  of  signals were  Euclidean  spaces,  and the  equilibrium prices were 
smooth  functions of  the joint  signal, then the equilibrium prices could not be 
revealing  if  the  dimension  of  the  joint  signal  exceeded  the  number of  com- 
modities. 
Whether or not rational expectations equilibria exist generically, in some fairly 
general model, is an open question. If the sets of signals are not finite, then H1 is 
infinite dimensional.  In this case,  the  concept  of  "negligible"  set  in H  is not 
straightforward; there will typically be a choice of natural topologies  on H, and 
there may be no natural measure corresponding to Lebesgue measure. J. Green 
[4] has given an example with infinite signal spaces in which no rational expec- 
tations equilibrium exists, and stimulated by Green's example Jordan and Radner 
[9]  have  constructed  an  example  with  infinite  E  and  S  in  which  the  set  of 
economies  (suitably topologized)  for which no rational expectations equilibrium 
exists has a nonempty interior. 
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